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Abstract 
A collaborative network is a network consisting of a variety of autonomous actors (e.g. 
enterprises, organizations and people) that collaborate to better achieve common or 
compatible goals. A collaborative network starts with a contract and then the 
collaboration partners conduct business as described in the contract. Before engaging 
in such a collaboration, partners need to reach an agreement regarding their 
responsibilities in the collaboration and  develop a shared understanding regarding the 
endurability and the profitability of the collaboration. Here in this paper, we aim at 
analysing  the  endurability  of  collaborative  networks  based  on  the  trust  relations 
between collaboration partners and also introducing a new approach to do profitability 
analysis for collaborative networks. Therefore, we enrich the value models of business 
collaborations with information about trust, endurability and profitability. 
 
Keywords: Collaborative Networks , Endurability, Profitability, Trust 
 
 
 
1   Introduction 
Nowadays, the networks that enterprises operate in become increasingly complicated. 
There are many reasons for this. Among others we can refer to more complicated user 
needs, upward tendency toward specialization, changing customer demands, higher 
customer satisfaction indexes, advancement in information and communication 
technology  (ICT),  globalization  of markets  and  manufacturing,  gaining  competitive 
advantages, being exposed to a bigger audience, etc. In fact, collaboration of different 
enterprises to co-produce a product or service is nothing new however, here in this 
paper, we focus only on those business collaborations which are facilitated by ICT. In 
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other words, we are concerned with the design and use of IT in IT-enabled business 
collaborations. 
 
A collaborative network is a network consisting of a set of autonomous actors (e.g. 
enterprises,   organizations   and   people)   that   collaborate   to   achieve   common   or 
compatible goals [Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh 2004, Camarinha-Matos and 
Afsarmanesh 2008]. Collaborative networks come with different names in the literature, 
such as business webs [Tapscott et al. 2000], Virtual enterprise (VE) [Katzy and Schuh 
1997, Nayak et al. 2001], extended enterprise [Browne and Zhang 1999, Mostert 2004], 
strategic alliances [Rigsbee 2000, Mowery et al. 1996], value constellations [Normann 
and Ramírez 1993, Normann and Ramírez 1994, Gordijn and Akkermans 2002], to 
name a few. Tapscott et al. define a business web as a collection of enterprises designed 
to jointly satisfy a consumer need [Tapscott et al. 2000]. Katzy and Schuh define virtual 
enterprise as a temporary co-operation to realize the value of a short-term business 
opportunity that none of the partners can capture on its own [Katzy and Schuh 1997]. 
The virtual enterprise manifests a dynamic environment where individual enterprises 
work  together  for  a  relatively  short  time,  to  satisfy  niche  market  demand  quickly 
whereas the concept of the extended enterprise focuses on long-term enterprise 
relationships across the value chain. The extended enterprise is responsible for the 
whole product life cycle and it includes the relationships that an enterprise has with its 
customers, suppliers, business partners, even former competitors and so on [Browne and 
Zhang 1999]. A strategic alliance is a cooperation or collaboration that aims for a 
synergy where each partner hopes that the benefits from the alliance will be greater than 
those from individual efforts. The alliance often involves technology transfer (access to 
knowledge and expertise), economic specialization, shared expenses and shared risk 
[Mowery et al. 1996]. Normann and Ramirez [Normann and Ramírez 1993, Normann 
and Ramírez 1994] introduce the value constellation as a successor of the value chain 
[Porter 1996]. A value constellation is a construct where actors come together to co- 
produce value with each other. 
 
As it can be seen, the collaboration of some enterprises to co-produce a product/service 
is the common theme of all the above definitions. Nevertheless, this collaboration can 
have different forms based on the degree of commitment and the level of engagement of 
the  partner  members.  For  example  those  enterprises  that  provide  complementary 
products or services in a touristic area can make a collaborative relationship in which 
many local tourism providers, collaborate in order to market a particular location as a 
fun tourism destination. This would involve hospitality service providers like hotels, 
B&Bs, guesthouses, and self-catering owners working closely with providers of activity 
based interests (horse riding, water sports, biking, hiking, historical places of interest, 
fishing, quad biking etc.) to create a compelling holiday destination tourism value 
proposition for a specific area. This type of collaboration can be created by publishing 
some joint brochures, recommending each other’s services to existing and potential 
customers, creating a hyperlink on each other’s website, etc.. Due to the complementary 
nature of their products and services, these companies would be more successful and 
have more profitability if they collaborate. At the same time, they can still do their own 
business outside the collaboration and if one partner fails in delivering the promised 
service/product it does not necessarily terminate the collaboration. 
 
In contrast, there are business collaborations in which each partner contributes with its 
own specific products or services to achieve a common goal that cannot be achieved 
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when one of the actors drops out of the collaboration. Therefore the collaboration of all 
partners is necessary to achieve the common goal of the collaboration. If one of the 
partners  fails  in  delivering  his/her  undertakings  and  responsibilities  then  no  other 
partner can achieve its goal(s) and consequently the collaboration fails. For example, a 
web shop, a logistics company, a payment provider and an authentication provider can 
jointly provide the on-line shopping service to consumers. In this collaboration if one of 
the partners for example the logistic company fails in delivering its undertakings the 
collaboration fails. This type of collaboration manifests a joint work which we call 
collaborative network and here in this paper we address this kind of collaboration. 
 
We use business value models to model collaborative networks. A business value model 
helps the collaboration partners to share their understanding regarding the collaboration 
and enables them to analyse economic profitability of the collaborative network. The 
main goal of business value modelling is to reach agreement amongst profit-and-loss 
responsible actors regarding the question "Who is offering what of value to whom and 
expects what of value in return?" We use the e3value method to describe/represent 
collaborative  networks  from  value  point  of  view  [Gordijn  and  Akkermans  2002]. 
E3value is supported by a tool that allows profitability analysis for all partners in the 
network. 
 
In the current state of the art, the collaboration partners are assumed to be trustworthy 
while designing value models. However, in real life, all partners are not equally 
trustworthy and therefore, before a business value model can be put into operation, any 
unrealistic trust assumptions that it contains, must be removed. The contribution of the 
paper is to enrich business value models with trust and then analyse the impact and 
implication of trust on the endurability and profitability of collaborative networks. 
 
In section 2, we discuss the endurability of collaborative networks using existing trust 
relations between partners. Then in section 3 we introduce a new approach to refine the 
current profitability analysis by taking into account the cost which is associated with the 
realization of every value exchange. This allows us to compare risk (working with 
untrustworthy partners) with profitability. Together, this allows us to define criteria that 
business actors can use when deciding to join collaborative networks. Later in section 4, 
we apply our findings on a case study and finally we conclude in section 5. 
 
 
2   Endurability of Collaborative Networks 
Endurability of a collaborative network is a major property of the collaborative network 
that  enables  it  to  continue  to  function  despite  undesirable  events.  For  actors 
participating in a collaborative network it is vital to have an indication of how durable is 
the collaboration. Each business collaboration is meant to be operating for a specific 
period (contract period) and therefore collaboration partners need to know if the 
collaboration is strong enough to last throughout this contract period. To analyse the 
vulnerability of collaborative networks, we consider two main aspects 1) structural 
stability 2) execution durability. Structural stability stems from the relations between the 
partners in the collaboration while execution durability arises from the way in which 
partners collaborate with each other. 
 
For  structural  stability  analysis  of  a  collaborative  network  we  use  the  initial  trust 
relations  between  actors  and  for  execution  durability  we  exploit  the  profitability 
analysis of collaborative networks. We will see that the more initial trust relations there 
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are  between  the  actors  and  the  more  profitable  collaboration  there  are  the  less 
vulnerable the collaborative network is, and consequently the more durable would be 
the collaboration. 
 
 
 
2.1   Structural Stability of Collaborative Networks 
We use the trust relations between the actors to determine how stable a collaborative 
network is. To do that, we assume that we are comparing two or more overlapping 
collaborative networks. Then we first design a model which we call the general trust 
model, which represents all actors in all possible collaborative networks and the trust 
relations between them. The general trust model is a directed graph in which a directed 
edge/arrow from actor A to actor B means that actor A trusts actor B to collaborate with 
it in a business collaborative network. In other words, the trustor accepts the risks of 
collaboration with the trustee. Trust is always with regard to a specific activity and here 
it is with regard to the responsibilities and agreements made in the contract. When an 
actor trusts another actor it means that the trustor trusts the trustee to act according to 
the agreements made in the contract/value model. 
 
We also design a simple model which we call value exchange model for each 
collaborative network. The value exchange model is a simplified version of a value 
model of e3value. The value exchange model is an undirected graph in which nodes 
represent the actors participating in the collaborative network and an edge between two 
actors means that those two actors are going to be in direct relation with each other in 
the collaborative network i.e. they exchange value objects with each other in the value 
model and therefore there should be a trust relation between those two actors. We will 
use the trust model to analyse static endurability and the value exchange model to 
analyse execution stability of collaborative networks. 
 
After designing the general trust model and the value exchange model of each 
collaborative network, we classify the collaborative networks in three groups by 
superimposing the value exchange model associated with each collaborative network on 
the general trust model as follows: 
 
• Stable: If there is a mutual trust relation in the general trust model between 
every  two  actors that  are  connected  in the  value  exchange  model,  then  we 
conclude that the corresponding collaborative network of the value exchange 
model is structurally stable. 
• Weakly Stable: If there is at least one trust relation in the general trust model 
between every two actors that are connected in the value exchange model and at 
least one of the trust relations is not mutual, then we conclude that the 
corresponding collaborative network of the value exchange model is structurally 
weakly stable. 
• Not Stable: If there is no trust relation in the general trust model between a pair 
of actors that are connected in the value exchange model, then we conclude that 
the corresponding collaborative network of the value exchange model is 
structurally not stable. 
 
Those collaborative networks which fall in the last group (Not Stable) are left out of 
consideration, since they are not feasible and not realizable because as Kenneth J. 
Arrow [Arrow 1973, page 24] pointed out " . . . ethical elements enter in some measure 
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into every contract; without them no market could function. There is an element of trust 
in every transaction". Those collaborative networks which fall in the first group (Stable) 
are better (more enduring) than those that are in the second group (Weakly Stable). In 
general, the more mutual trust relations between the actors the better because more 
coordination patterns can be deployed and the realization of the collaboration manifests 
more flexibilities. 
 
The trust model is dynamic and it can undergo some changes during the course of the 
collaboration. These changes can be because of the appearance of a new trust relation or 
disappearance of an existing one or even the increase or decrease in the trust value of 
existing trust relations. These changes may imply certain collaboration patterns and 
therefore actors need to adapt their actions accordingly. 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates a collaboration between two actors, A and B, in which actor B 
provides A with a service for a fee (see Figure 1(a)). Assume that at the outset of the 
collaboration, only A trusts B and B doesn't trust A (see Figure 1(b)). Theretofore actor 
B agrees to collaborate with actor A only if A pays B before receiving the service each 
time (see Figure 1(c)). 
 
Now, assume that after some time, B grows trust in A and therefore a new trust relation 
is added to the trust model (see Figure 2(b)). This might change the process because B 
might drop the payment condition so that A can pay B after receiving the service. This 
means that A can pay either after or before or even partly after and partly before 
receiving the service. This new situation is demonstrated in Figure 2. Note that in the 
coordination pattern shown in Figure 2(e) both actors need to trust each other at some 
point in time during the collaboration because actor A first pays 20% of the fee before 
receiving the service and then actor B provides A with the service before receiving the 
fee of the service completely. These percentages can also change due to the changes in 
the level of trust that each actor has in the other actor. 
 
Hence, changes in the trust model can implicate some changes in the way that actors 
collaborate with each other. In an extreme case, two actors which are in direct relation 
with each other in the collaboration, might end up in a situation in which none of them 
trusts the other anymore and therefore the collaboration terminates. That's the time to go 
back to the drawing board and design a whole new collaborative network from the 
scratch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) A value exchange     (b) Trust relation                     (c) Coordination pattern for paying 
between actors                       the fee before receiving the service 
 
Figure 1: A coordination pattern of a value exchange 
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(a) A value exchange. (b) Trust relation (c) Coordination pattern for paying
 between actors fee before receiving the service 
 
 
(d) Coordination pattern for paying        (e) A coordination pattern in which paying the fee 
the fee after receiving the service               and receiving the service are intermingled 
 
Figure 2: Possible coordination patterns of a value exchange 
 
 
2.2   Execution Durability of Collaborative Networks 
Having enough initial trust relations between the collaboration partners, we can 
implement the business case and put it in action. For how long the collaboration goes 
on, depends on many factors. To name a few: what is the initial trust situation?, how 
sensitive the stakeholders are? (do they break the collaboration after noticing that the 
other partner do not fully respect the promises?), how profitable the collaboration is?, 
etc. After all, the collaboration is meant to be during a specific period (contract period), 
so we can rephrase the initial question as: Does the collaboration last throughout the 
contract period? 
 
The only way to know if the collaboration can last throughout the contract period is to 
wait until the contract period is over. Nevertheless there are some indications which can 
be used in the reasoning process. To do that we need to predict the way in which 
partners will collaborate with each other. If they fulfil their responsibilities in full or at 
least to a great extent and if the collaboration is predicted to be profitable enough for all 
partners, then we can expect that the collaboration will last throughout the contract 
period. If a partner does not act according to its promises then the continuation of the 
collaboration depends on the quality of his collaboration performance and also on the 
sensitivity of its partners. 
 
A collaboration partner might neglect some of the flaws of its partner or degrade its 
estimated trust value in the wrong doer partner slightly, while another partner might 
degrade its estimated trust value severely or even break the collaboration in reaction to 
the same flaw. The sensitivity of a collaboration partner in breaking a collaboration 
depends highly on the profitability of the collaboration. In some cases, a collaboration 
might be still profitable/motivating enough for an actor even if its partner does not act 
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fully according to the agreements and therefore that actor will still continue with the 
collaboration though probably with more precautions and preventive measures. 
 
Because of the above reasons it is hard to predict how long the collaboration will last, 
nevertheless structural stability and equitable profit distribution among the group (i.e. 
each collaboration partner earns enough profit) are two main criteria which can be 
considered. 
 
3   Profitability Analysis of Collaborative Networks 
The e3value tool which we use to model collaborative networks, consists of a graphical 
part and a computational part. The graphical tool is a diagram editor and the 
computational tool is a spread sheet editor with algorithms that can perform Net Present 
Value (NPV) estimations for the actors in the diagram. To do the profitability analysis 
of a collaborative network, each partner needs to assign values in terms of money to 
each value object which it gives and receives. That basically means how much each 
object is worth for each actor. In this way, each actor can measure how much 
value/money it gets per value exchange provided that the exchange takes place as 
described in the value model. Then by estimating the number of value exchanges during 
the contract period we can tell each actor how much profit it is going to earn out of the 
collaboration. There are some assumptions in this approach and to better understand the 
mechanism we need to explain some of these assumptions. 
 
• Assigning   monetary   values   to   all   exchanged   objects   is   not   always 
straightforward. If someone is paying 10 € to watch a movie we generally can 
assume that watching the movie is worth more than 10 € to that person. However 
assigning a specific value to the movie depends on many factors among others 
the personal taste of the person regarding that particular movie. In general, not 
every object of the same type delivered by an actor necessarily has the same 
value for another actor, and that makes assigning a fixed monetary value to 
objects not always straightforward. In addition, from the producer's point of 
view, actors need to assign monetary value to those objects which they deliver as 
a function of the cost of producing that object. This too is not always 
straightforward. 
 
• Estimating  the  number  of  expected exchanges  during  the  contract  period  is 
another challenging issue. 
 
• The value model describes an ideal situation in which all actors fulfil their 
responsibilities and act according to the agreements (i.e. actors are assumed to 
be trustworthy). To have a more realistic estimation of the profitability of a 
collaborative network we need to drop this assumption and take into account 
those factors that can affect the profitability of a collaborative network. It is not 
easy, if not impossible, to identify all possible risks and the probability and 
impact associated with each value exchange. 
 
Dropping each of these assumptions introduce some cost. Here in this paper we only 
discuss the third assumption. Dropping the third assumption would mean monitoring 
partners' behaviours  and inspecting  value  objects,  which impose  some  cost. In  the 
current state of the art of profitability analysis which are done based on the value model, 
this cost is not taken into account. To make the profitability analysis results more 
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 Va Vb 
A 10 € 12 € 
B 11 € 8 € 
 
 
realistic and reliable we suggest to assign a cost which we call risk cost to each value 
exchange and then adjust the results accordingly. 
 
The amount of surveillance and monitoring which an actor would like to have on the 
behavior of another actor in the collaboration, depends on the level of trust between 
those two actors. Therefore, to estimate the risk cost we first need to quantify the trust 
relations between the partners. In our previous work [Fatemi et al. 2011] we proposed a 
method for measuring and managing the trust values between the collaboration partners 
in a collaborative network. 
 
Now, consider the value exchange shown in Figure 3, which simply means actor A 
gives value object Va to actor B and in return actor B gives value object Vb to actor A 
and assume that actors A and B assign the monetary values to value objects Va and Vb 
as shown in Table 1. This implies that value object Va costs 10 € for actor A and it is 
worth 11 € for actor B and likewise value object Vb costs 8 € for actor B and it is worth 
12 € for actor A. This means that stakeholder A earns 2 € (12 € - 10 €) in each 
transaction and stakeholder B earns 3 € (11 € - 8 €), provided that the exchange takes 
place as described in the value model and the realization of the value exchange doesn't 
impose any extra cost. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A value exchange between                     Table 1: Monetary values of Va and Vb 
two stakeholders                                                 according to actors A and B 
 
 
Assuming that in a [0-1] scale, the trust value of A in B is 0.85 and the trust value of B 
in A is 0.90. This numbers can be interpreted in two ways: 1) Currently A is 85% 
certain that B will deliver value object Vb according to the agreements and analogously 
B is 90% certain that A will deliver value object Va according to the agreements. 2) A 
believes that, in the long run, 85% of the times B will deliver value object Vb according 
to the agreements and similarly B believes that, in the long run, 90% of the times A will 
deliver value object Va according to the agreements. 
 
Base on the above reasoning, the real profit which A can expect in this collaboration is 
(0.85 * 2 €) - (0.15 *10 €) = 0.2 € , because 85% of the times the exchange goes well 
while 15% of the times actor B does not fulfil the agreements (in the worst case actor B 
does not send actor A anything back) and therefore actor A loses its value object (Va) 
totally. Similarly, the real profit which B should expect is (0.9 * 3 €) - (0.10 * 8 €) = 1.9 € . 
 
As another case assume that A does not trust B and only B trusts A and the trust value 
of B in A is 0.8. This, first of all, means that only certain coordination patterns are 
applicable and also it means that A does not take any risk in this collaboration (i.e. actor 
A always receives value object Vb  first and then sends B value object Va  if he is 
satisfied with the exchange). Therefore the expected profit of A out of each exchange is 
2 € (12 € -10 €) and the expected profit of B is (0.8 * 3 €) - (0.20 * 8 €) = 0.8 € . 
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In this way all partners should calculate the refined profits and then decide for engaging 
in the collaboration only if the refined profitability estimations are still acceptable. 
Using  our  method  for  managing  trust  [Fatemi  et  al.  2011],  actors  can  do  this 
calculations at any point in time during the collaboration and make their decision for 
continuing the collaboration based on the result of the calculations. 
 
There are special kinds of value exchanges which we call not observable and in those 
cases the profitability analysis is even more complicated. For example assume that a 
pub  undertakes  to  pay  an  Intellectual  Property  Right  (IPR)  organization  a  special 
amount of money for playing each track of music for being able to play the music. 
Assume also that the IPR organization does not have any specific control on the pub, i.e. 
the IPR organization does not know which tracks the pub play. In this particular case, 
IPR organization either trusts pub and assumes that pub will always pay for all the 
tracks  or  it  needs  to  do inspections  to  verify  the  trustworthiness  of  the  pub.  This 
inspection costs money and it should be taken into account in the profitability analysis. 
We have used game theory concepts to analyse the profitability in these special 
transactions in which an actor collaborates with another actor in the hope that he would 
act reciprocally [Fatemi et  al. 2012]. The trusting actor runs an inspection, which costs 
money, every now and then to know if the other actor acts according to the agreements 
or  not.  Solving  the  game  provides  the  involved  actors  with  the  risk  cost  and 
consequently they can adjust their profits accordingly. 
 
What happens in reality is that an actor decides to engage in a collaboration with 
another actor which might be unknown to it. In that case, it means that the actor starts 
with full trust and therefore it accepts the risk of collaboration with an unknown actor 
which implies that the trusting actor might lose the value object it delivers completely 
without receiving anything in return. However our proposed method [Fatemi et al. 
2011] to manage the trust relations and the method presented here can be used later in 
the collaboration. 
 
 
4   An Illustrative Case Study 
We have applied the analysis presented in Sections 2 and 3 on an illustrative case study 
about educational services. The idea is that people are looking for specific jobs that 
require special skills. Since the required skills for a person (customer) cannot always be 
provided by a single educational service, it is needed to find meaningful combinations 
of services that can jointly provide a valuable solution to the customer, i.e. a service 
value network (SVN). 
 
To test our solution framework, we have harvested the publicly available National 
Database of Accredited Qualifications (NDAQ), which contains details of Recognized 
Awarding Organizations and Regulated Qualifications in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland  that  offer  different  skills  through  educational  services.  The  final  service 
catalogue is composed of 58 services provided by four service suppliers. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 depict two possible SVNs that have been composed to cover the need: 
"As a multimedia creator, How can I improve my skills?". As it can be observed in 
Figure 4, the SVN provides a solution to this need by networking several services. At 
the top, a service bundle offers the required skills FC1  (Digital Image Manipulation), 
FC2   (Photo  Image  Capture)  and  FC3   (Studio  Photography)  by  combining  three 
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educational services. At the bottom, three service enablers support the functioning of the 
service suppliers. 
 
In this manner the problem at hand is twofold: 1) It is required to provide a set of 
solutions  when  a  customer  needs  to  acquire  some  skills.  2)  Once  the  alternative 
solutions are offered to the customer, it is important to provide a selection criterion so 
that the customer can choose one option among the set of alternatives. 
 
To deal with the first issue, one of us has previously presented a framework that 
(semi)automatically composes alternative SVNs to cope with customer needs [Razo- 
Zapata et al. 2011]. Briefly, whereas a customer expresses his/her need in terms of the 
required functionalities (the skills in this context), and then a cluster-based algorithm 
composes alternative SVNs that can satisfy the given customer need, i.e. alternative 
networks of educational services [Razo-Zapata et al. 2011]. 
 
In order to solve the second issue, we propose the analysis described in Sections 2 and 3 
to  evaluate  the  endurability  and  profitability  of  a  given  SVN.  Consequently,  the 
customer is provided with information that allows him/her to choose one SVN not only 
matching his/her need in terms of required skills but also in terms of economic 
profitability. The 
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Figure 4: A service value network 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: A service value network 
 
 
 
trust relations and their quantified values are shown in the general trust model (See 
Figure 6). The value exchange model of the two collaborative networks are shown in 
Figures 7. In this models CGLI and UAL stand for 'the City and Guilds of London 
Institute' and 'University of the Arts London' respectively. 
 
After superimposing the value exchange models on the general trust model it turns out 
that the collaborative network shown in Figure 4 is Not Stable, and the collaborative 
network shown in Figure 5 is Weakly Stable. Therefore we exclude the collaborative 
network shown in Figure 4 and continue the profitability analysis with the collaborative 
network shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 6: General trust model 
 
 
 
 
 
(a): Value exchange model of collaborative              (b): Value exchange model of collaborative 
network in Figure 4                                                  network in Figure 5 
 
Figure 6: Value exchange models of collaborative networks 
 
 
 Money Certificate … 
Customer 1000 € 1200 € 
UAL 1000 € 700 € 
Table 2: Monetary values of value objects exchanged between the Customer and UAL 
 
 
 
To do the profitability analysis, the participating actors should assign monetary values 
to each value object they exchange. Table 2 shows the monetary values of a pair of 
value objects in the collaborative network shown in Figure 5.  For the sake of brevity, 
here we only explain the value exchange between the Customer and the UAL (see Table 
2). As it can be seen in the general trust model, the UAL does not trust the Customer so 
it does not take any risk in this collaboration therefore, it earns 300 € in this 
collaboration. However, the trust value of the Customer in the UAL is 0.95 therefore, 
the expected profit of the Customer is (0.95 * 200 €) - (0.05 *1000 €) = 140 € . 
 
In this case, we can interpret the results as follows: The UAL provides the Customer 
with a service/course and because the Customer is unknown to the UAL, it does not 
trust him/her therefore the UAL does not take any risks and it charges the Customer 
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1000€ upon registering for the course. On the other hand, based on the reputation of the 
UAL and/or the Customer's investigation, the Customer believes that with probability of 
95% the UAL provides the service/course as he/she expects. 
 
 
5   Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we analysed the collaborative networks from endurability and profitability 
points of view based on the trust relations between the collaboration partners. Providing 
the partners with value models supplemented by extra information regarding the 
endurability and profitability of the collaboration, enables them to decide on those 
collaborations which are more durable and profitable. Since value models depict the 
required exchanges to achieve a business goal, when they are enriched with information 
about trust, endurability and profitability, they can provide more insights to specify 
service level agreements among the participants within the network. 
 
Taking appropriate detective and preventive measures in value exchange process can 
affect the level of trust which collaboration actors have in each other. For example an 
actor that does not trust another actor might trust him if the collaboration is secured with 
appropriate safeguards. As future work we aim at enriching our analysis with safeguards 
and measures. 
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